Our analysis of Popper’s PHILOSOPHY of science focuses on his concepts of tradition and situational analysis. These concepts represent innovative Popperian contributions to a historical and hermeneutical turn in PHILOSOPHY of science that most of his critics, especially Kuhn, fail to recognize. According to his historical view, Popper conceives sciences as a complex of traditions in continuous transformation and progress by means of rational discussion of theories. In order to grasp the rational progress of scientific traditions, Popper proposes an original method that he calls “situational analysis”. This hermeneutical method seeks to understand the concepts, hypotheses, actions, practices, controversies and products that scientists made to solve problems in their specific historical contexts to improve the truth content of theories. In addition to his historical and hermeneutical turn, Popper also inquired about the social and POLITICAL conditions for the progress of scientific traditions by means of intersubjective criticism of theories and conjectures. According to him, the rational discussion of ideas requires, as necessary conditions, plurality of ideas, intellectual humility, and freedom of thought and communication that can only exist in an open and democratic society. With these considerations, we may say that in addition to a historical and hermeneutical turn, Popper also contributed to a social and POLITICAL turn in the PHILOSOPHY of science

The condition of success and reasons of failure of development strategies and plans, has been one of the most important “development studies” issues. It has been explained in different ways, such as that there is strong relationship between efficiency of development strategies and plans and development theories. paradigmatic-implicative theory, which has explained the relation of development theories and POLITICAL thought and identify the development theory as one of the practical implication of POLITICAL thought, one of the conditions of success of development strategies and development plans can refer to the POLITICAL thought foundation. So we explore the POLITICAL thought which support the Structural Adjustment model, which is the most important development model in 1980s. We use “qualitative content analysis” method in this paper to show that the POLITICAL foundation of Structural Adjustment model is based on “libertization through rights protection”, in correspondence with ROBERT NOZICK POLITICAL thought.

This paper is an examination of ROBERT NOZICK's argument in The Nature of Rationality that instrumental rationality is defective, and that the defects of instrumental rationality can be understood through a careful appraisal of the significance of Newcomb's paradox and the prisoners' dilemma.In both Anarchy, State and Utopia and in The Nature of Rationality, NOZICK considers the question of why we should be rational, and concludes that the call of reason issues from the fact that we value what we are. Rationality is so important to us that it becomes a duty because it is in terms of and by means of rationality that we understand who we are. Our worldview is an artifact shaped, at least in part, by our evaluative standards of cognitive assessment.NOZICK goes on to ask why we should value that. And to answer the query, he considers the functions that rationality may have, beginning with instrumental rationality. To be instrumentally rational is to pursue one's goals and desires in the most efficient and effective way. Hence, prudence and self-interest commend instrumental rationality, or, what amounts to the same thing, instrumentality commends itself. Being prudent is itself prudent. However, NOZICK concedes that the value of rationality goes beyond what can be explained in terms of a purely instrumental rationality.Even if we were to begin with a purely instrumental view of rationality, we might come to value it for its own sake, and so it may come to have intrinsic value. We should be rational because we value being that way. The endorsement given by reason to instrumental rationality, however, is not the issuing of a blank check. Instrumental rationality itself will counsel that we not put too much time and effort into developing the skills of instrumental rationality, for beyond a certain point the amount gained in overall efficiency will not be worth the lost opportunities for other pursuits. NOZICK argues that actions could acquire value not only because of the consequences which can be expected to follow from them, but because of what NOZICK calls their symbolic utility. Some, but not all, cases in which one decides to perform an act because of its symbolic utility appear to be rational. All of the convincing cases of rational action performed because of symbolic utility offered by NOZICK are cases of action performed in accordance with principle. Consideration of the sage provides the occasion to introduce additional means by which value may accrue to an action, in terms of which we may judge the performance of the action to be rational. There is no harm in considering these means as independent elements of symbolic utility, provided we bear in mind that these elements may be quantitatively incommensurable with those derived from accordance with principle. Rules or principles provide only one way in which actions may be guided. Another way is by consideration of consequences. A third way in which actions may be guided is with reference to virtue. Sometimes the appeal to virtue will be personified in an exemplar. We acquire skills by imitation of the actions of teachers. We may attempt to acquire virtues by acting in ways that are typical of the virtuous exemplar. This mode of practical guidance plays an important role in various traditions, from those of the ancient Greeks to those of the Abrahamic religions.While NOZICK argues in favor of an expanded notion of instrumental rationality, I counter that the notion of practical rationality should be expanded beyond that which can be considered as instrumental rationality.

The writer of this paper has tried to portray Plato's ideal government on the basis of his Republic. Apparently, Plato's main purpose in this dialogue was to define true justice rather than have his intended ideal government realized. The gist of his words concerning justice is that everyone must do the job that conforms to his nature. Of course, as Plato himself has pointed out, introducing and defining such an ideal city or utopia will inspire people to model it and create a terrestrial form of that heavenly pattern in the best way possible. This paper discusses the various defects and strengths of Plato's ideal society.

In this paper, I address the issue of the possible applicability of the ideas of Karl R. Popper’s social and POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY in the contemporary POLITICAL life of postcolonial countries. Through reference to the reception of Popper’s PHILOSOPHY in Central and Eastern Europe, I argue that Popper’s writings were effective in catalysing the POLITICAL wholesale transformation by undermining Marxists’ pretensions to scientific status rather than through his anti-utopian and anti-revolutionary POLITICAL recommendations. In the context of attempts to apply Popper’s ideas in postcolonial countries, especially Sub-Saharan Africa, I claim that the influence of Popper’s social thought on the politics of those countries may not be as effective as expected or desired.

In order to create a fair and neutral position Rawls disregards the psychological features such as altruism and envy that might influence the establishment of the principle of justice. It is however worth noting that in this process Rawls takes the principle of mutually disinterested principle in original position for granted. ROBERT NOZICK as Rawls's intellectual rival who is among the founders of the libertarian school criticizes Rawls on the ground that Rawls's initiation not only is not fair and neutral it is not in fact conformant to the human's nature. Removal of envy from the original position is regarded as indefensible by NOZICK because he believes that all features and qualifications of human nature should be considered in a POLITICAL theory. However, NOZICK claims that envy is not completely absent in Rawls's theory. He believes that the principle of difference introduces envy to Rawls's theory. This article examines NOZICK's criticisms and analyses his defense of the essentiality of envy in the development of a theory of justice. It also investigates whether Rawls's theory of justice will itself create the envy. The methodological framework employed in this paper for the examination of the views of Rawls and NOZICK is comparison and analysis of the content.

In this treatise the writer is trying to find the esoteric logic of POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY of Islam in middle age by the frame of POLITICAL Power. Therefore with presumption POLITICAL power influence to compass the POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY of Islam in middle age that have intermediate relation with the POLITICAL authority in same time, with this question that what is influence and impressible among POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY of Islam in middle age and POLITICAL power, the subject is scrutinizing on four pedestals as low and POLITICAL leader and medina & population.

Friendship was one of the pivotal notions in Aristotle’s Ethics. It has, however, been neglected and marginalized in the history of western thought. There has, however, in recent times a new attentionbeing paid to this notion. This essay studies the relationship between contemporary POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY and friendship by assesing the notion of solidarity in this regard.

Since the second half of the 20th century, women have become one of the most controversial topics in POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY. Some thinkers of women's studies, such as Susan Muller Okin and Carol Pattman, showed in their research that POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY was originally male, and therefore, as soon as it is placed against women as equals, it collapses so much that there is nothing to use. It does not remain. Therefore, two fundamental questions are raised at the same time: First, what should women's studies do to raise its philosophical issues? And second, what to do with the great tradition of POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY? So far, three answers have been given to these two questions: escaping from PHILOSOPHY, establishing feminist POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, and de-gendering POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY. But as we will show, these answers are ultimately not convincing. On the other hand, in this article, we have put forward the idea of neutral POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, which tries to find a way to preserve the great tradition of POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY with the inferential analytical method that governs philosophical debates, and that the discussion of women in terms of existence Cognitive find the possibility of being present and recognized.

POLITICAL life in a religious society requires both rational and religious bases and detailed precepts regulating POLITICAL behaviors within a POLITICAL order. The first need is satisfied by POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY and the second by POLITICAL jurisprudence. The POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY produced in the Islamic culture is responsible for the identity, survival, growth, and promotion of POLITICAL life whereas POLITICAL jurisprudence has a pivotal role in organizing POLITICAL life on the basis of justice. The question arising is what the similarities between POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY and POLITICAL jurisprudence are and how their necessity and differentiation in POLITICAL and religious life can be elaborated. Although they have common foundations, they are very different in their subject matter, goal, method, and problems. The present paper studies these differences and similarities.